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Abstract 
 
The CNN exit polls after the 2004 election rated ‘moral values’ the most 
important issue; next came ‘jobs and the economy.’ Eighty percent of the voters who 
rated moral values the most important issue voted for Bush while eighty percent of the 
voters who rated jobs and the economy the most important voted for Kerry. We study the 
extent to which the distribution of voter opinion on moral values influences the positions 
that parties take on the economic issue, which we take to be the size of the public sector, 
through political competition. 
There are at least two distinct ways this influence might occur. First, because the 
Republican Party is identified with a traditionalist stance on moral values, some voters 
who desire a large public sector may nevertheless vote Republican because traditionalist 
morality is important for them. This we call the policy bundle effect. Second, it may be 
the case that those who subscribe to a traditionalist morality take economic conservatism 
to be part of that view, in the sense that they view the state as, for instance, usurping the 
role of the individual and/or family. We call this effect the moral Puritanism effect.  
Thus economic conservatism in the US may be politically strengthened by moral 
traditionalism because the Republican Party links the two issues (policy bundle) or 
because moral traditionalists in the US are anti-statist (in the Puritan sense).  
Our analysis will enable us to predict how equilibrium policies proposed by 
Democratic and Republican Parties would change if all voters had the same view on the 
moral-values issue, and we will decompose these changes into the aforementioned two 
effects. 
 
JEL Classification: D3, D7, H2 
 
Keywords: moral values, redistribution, moral Puritanism effect, policy bundle effect, 
party unanimity Nash equilibrium 
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“Democrats are assaulting our basic values. They attacked the integrity of the 
family and parental rights. They ignored traditional morality. And they still do.”  
The 1984 Platform of the Republican Party 
 
“The advantage we have is that liberals and feminists don’t generally go to church. 
They don’t gather in one place three days before the election.” Ralph Reed, The 
Christian Coalition 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Republican Party, whose economic policies are perhaps in the interest of the 
top 5% of the wealth distribution, is supported by approximately one-half of the US 
electorate.  President George W. Bush, during his first term, has made quite clear what 
his economic policies are – from tax cuts that benefit primarily the very rich, engendering 
large deficits, to abolition of the inheritance tax, and privatizing social security. 
 In contrast, the policies of the Democratic Party are not left-wing: they are 
moderate.  It would seem that, if voters were rational and concerned largely about the 
economic issue, the Democratic Party would receive the vast majority of the vote.  Why 
is this not the case? 
 Many explanations can be offered, but we believe the three most likely 
explanations are the following: 
• Cognitive errors and false consciousness.  Voters make cognitive errors 
concerning economic policy.  They do not make the connection between taxation and the 
supply of government goods and services.  This can be viewed as a special case of not 
understanding the mapping from policies to outcomes.   What voters are concerned with 
are economic outcomes (their consumption of various goods, and perhaps the 
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consumption of others – we do not assume voters are entirely selfish); what they do not 
understand is how policies engender outcomes. ‘False consciousness’ might be one 
description of this phenomenon.  But false consciousness also applies to another 
phenomenon, which is distinct from this one – the belief by poor people that rich people 
deserve their earnings, and it would be unjust to redistribute through taxation. 
• Imperfect representation.  Politicians represent the wealthy.  Bartels 
(2002), Gilens (2003), and Jacobs and Page (2003) have shown that politicians reflect the 
preferences of the wealthy, not the average voter.   One mechanism, of several, may be 
that political parties, under a regime of private funding, represent their contributors.   
Thus, the political competition between Democrats and Republicans may be one between 
two parties each of whom represents the wealthy, which would skew the equilibrium 
economic policies to the Right. 
• Policy bundling.  Other issues, besides the economic issue, are of 
importance to voters, and the support for the Republican Party may be in part due to the 
bundling of the economic issue with these other issues.  Important non-economic issues 
are race issues, gun control, abortion, gay marriage (family values), and foreign policy.   
Thus the Republicans may have crafted a program with a large constituency, in spite of 
their economic position.  Put somewhat differently, their position on non-economic issues 
may win the Republicans a sufficiently large support that they need not compromise on 
their extreme economic position. 
It is not our aim in this paper to examine the relative importance of these three 
possible explanations for the vitality of the Republican Party. We focus on the third issue 
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while taking the US presidential election of 2004 as an example. In particular, we study 
the importance of moral value issues. 
The so-called ‘American exceptionalism’ literature, dating back to Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, emphasizes that moral Protestantism (in particular, 
that of evangelicals), together with racial division, has always had an unusually powerful 
influence on the US political culture. For the period 1972-1992, we have demonstrated 
the importance of the race issue in the US politics (Lee and Roemer, 2004).  Today, 
however, the ‘values’ issue may be more important, although the race issue and the 
values issue are often interlinked as can be seen in the case of the Ku Klux Klan 
movement in the 1920 and prevalence of racially segregated religious schools. 
Seymour Martin Lipset (1990, 1996), a leading contemporary advocate of 
American exceptionalism, argues that from the colonial time to the present, a particular 
set of religious values and ideological emphases have distinguished Americans. Among 
these ideological tendencies two are especially distinctive: (1) a streak of conservative 
moralism that fuels recurring crusades for social reform, and (2) meritocratic 
individualism that supports the spirit of capitalism, anti-statist attitudes and a bourgeois 
economy. Hoover et. al (2000) examine the extent to which evangelical influences on 
moral conservatism and economic conservatism are similar in the United States and 
Canada, and conclude that evangelicalism’s influence on moral conservatism and value 
priorities is transnational, but its influence on economic conservatism is distinctively 
American.1 
                                                 
1 According to Hoover et al. (2000), evangelicals were identified by their agreement with 
all of the following ‘common denominator’ evangelical beliefs statements: (1) I feel that 
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Religion, like superstition, derives from irrational human fears and anxieties; it is 
a mechanism for people to ward off forces that they could not rationally explain. In 
contrary to the argument that religious beliefs, by requiring abstract thinking and 
intellectual inquiry, are positively correlated with education (McCleary and Barro, 2003; 
Sacerdote and Glazer, 2001), religious people are predominantly uneducated and living in 
rural areas.  
Marx and Engels believed that religion appealed most strongly to the oppressed 
who desperately needed some explanation for their plight. Christianity found its pioneers 
among its slave populations because it promised them the solace of a better life to come; 
psychologically, the Christian religion was a balm, a salve for despair. Consequently the 
growth of Christianity (and probably almost all religions) was encouraged by ruling 
classes because it might teach the ‘lower orders’ – be they slaves, serfs, workers, peasants, 
or colonial citizens – to accept their condition as ‘God’s will’ and to look for solace in the 
afterlife. This is the precise sense when Marx says religion is the ‘opiate’ of the people.  
Marx and Engels expected a rising of a new, just world order, and predicted that 
all the artificial doctrines developed to support the dethroned system – including religion 
– would be consigned to the ‘dustbin of history’ in the new social order where 
humankind would reclaim its proper place as the maker of its own destiny. What Marx 
perhaps could not see is that persistence of religion may make the rising of the new world 
order difficult. 
                                                                                                                                                 
through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, God provided a way for the forgiveness 
of my sins; (2) I believe the Bible is the inspired word of God; (3) I have committed my 
life to Christ and consider myself to be a converted Christian; (4) I feel it is very 
important to encourage non-Christians to become Christians.  
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The election of a Catholic president (John F. Kennedy) in 1960 in a country 
where Protestants are a vast majority was widely considered marking the end of sectarian 
religious appeals in American politics. In the last twenty years, however, those sectarian 
religious issues and moral Puritan themes that many observers declared no longer to be 
salient from the American political scene have assumed much greater importance in 
political debate and percolated through presidential politics. In the 2000 campaign for the 
Republican nomination, George W. Bush, who stumbled badly in early primary elections, 
survived the early defeats only because conservative Protestants – whom Senator John 
McCain once denounced as ‘agents of intolerance’ who exerted an ‘evil influence’ on the 
Republican party – rallied to his cause in key states. Throughout the campaign, Bush 
emphasized his religious conversion and called for state funding of social services 
delivered through religious organizations.  
In this paper, we will study the electoral consequence of the moral values issue in 
the 2004 presidential election by distinguishing what we call the policy bundle effect 
(PBE) from the moral Puritarism effect (MPE).  
There are at least two distinct ways the influence of values might occur. First 
because the Republican party is identified with a traditionalist stance on moral values, 
some voters who desire a large public sector may nevertheless vote Republican because 
traditionalist morality is important for them. This we call the policy bundle effect. Second, 
it may be the case that those who subscribe to a traditionalist morality take economic 
conservatism to be part of that view, in the sense that they view the state as, for instance, 
usurping the role of the individual and/or family. We call this effect the moral Puritanism 
effect.  
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Section 2 carries out some econometric analysis of the 2004 election. Section 3 
describes our model and the method of decomposition that we will employ. Section 4 
summarizes our numerical computation results. Section 5 concludes. The ANES variables 
used in the paper are defined in Appendix. 
 
2. Econometric analysis of the 2004 election data 
 
In our empirical analysis and numerical computation, we use an advance release 
of the 2004 ANES pre-post study. The sample consists of a new cross-section of 
respondents that yielded 1,212 face-to-face interviews in the pre-election study, 1,066 of 
which later provided a face-to-face interview in the post-election study. Data collection 
was conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.2 
We first construct four persistent issues in the US politics – the ideal size of the 
public sector, the issue of moral values, the race issue, and the issue of libertarianism – 
and four contemporary issues of the 2004 election – the approval on the Iraq war, the 
Bush tax cut, the social security reform, and the school voucher. For every opinion 
variable in the ANES2004 which takes the value of j ranging from k to k+n, where k is an 
integer and n is a positive integer, we convert it into ( 1)
2
j k
n
− −
+
. Thus every converted 
value lies strictly between 0 and 1. 
                                                 
2 Just right after we complete this paper, the full version of ANES2004 was released. 
According to the official web page of the National Election Studies, however, the major 
difference between the full version and the advance version is that the former includes 
non-survey question variable and corrects for some errors in the latter. We corrected the 
errors of the advance release here, so that the dataset we use contains the same survey 
question variables as the full version. 
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The four persistent issues in the US politics are constructed in the following way. 
For the preference of the public sector, we take the average of the following three 
variables (see Appendix for their definitions): (1) spending; (2) job; and (3) health. For 
the moral values issue, we take the average of the following four groups of variables: (1) 
women’s role in the society (womenrole, workingmom, and womenhome); (2) 
attitudes on abortion (abortion); (3) attitudes on homosexuals (homo_nodiscrimination, 
gaymarriage) and; (4) attitudes on traditionalism and modernism (tradition_important, 
newlifestyles_important). For the race issue, we take the average of the two variables: 
(1) aidtoblacks; and (2) blackfavor. Finally the issue of libertarianism was measured by 
the attitude towards big government (biggovt).  
The four contemporary issues are, on the other hand, constructed from the 
corresponding questionnaires in the ANES: iraqwarissue, taxcutissue, ssreform, 
schoolvouchers. These are specific issues in the 2004 election. 
We take the actual vote share of the 2004 election as the observed vote share, 
while taking as the population citizens voting for either party D or party R. Estimating 
the observed policy position of the two parties is tricky; announced size of the public 
sector or announced stance on the moral values issue are rarely observable, although we 
know which party takes a more conservative stance on each of these issues. The ANES 
2004 provides information on the public perception about the position of the presidential 
candidates and the two parties on several variables, such as spending, job, womenrole, 
abortion etc. We take the mean values of these variables for each candidate (party) as the 
candidates’ (parties’) position on these issues; if voters are perceptive, this assumption is 
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not unreasonable.  We then take the average of the candidate position and the party 
position as the observed party position on specific policy issues.  
Regarding the size of the public sector, only two variables (spending and job) 
have observed party positions. We take the average of the observed positions of these two 
variables to be the observed party policy on the size of the public sector. Regarding the 
moral value issues, again only two variables (womenrole and abortion) have observed 
party positions. We take the average of the observed positions of these two variables to 
be the observed party policy on the moral values issue. 
We first ran a probit regression to see the salient determinants of the voting 
pattern in the 2004 election. The dependent variable is the dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent voted for Republicans and the independent variables are the four 
persistent election issues, the four temporary issues, and demographic variables such as 
age, education, household income, etc. Table 1 shows the result. The first column reports 
the regression coefficients and the second column reports the coefficients in terms of 
marginal effects.  
 
[See Table 1 about here] 
 
We first observe that out of the four persistent issues, the size of the public sector, 
the moral values issue, and the race issue are highly salient in determining the voting 
pattern. This may suggest that the most desirable model should consider a model of 
political competition with three policy issues; the current limitation on the computation 
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time forbids us to pursue this. The current paper chooses the moral values issue, rather 
than the race issue, as the second policy issue. 
Not surprisingly, a few contemporary issues, such as the approval for the Iraqwar, 
are highly salient in determining the outcome in the 2004 election. We focus on the 
persistent issues rather than temporary issues in our analysis because we are more 
interested in the long-run pattern of American politics. We assume that the contemporary 
issues do not affect the policy positions of the two parties on the two persistent issues 
upon which we focus. 
Table 2 examines the determinants of the two issues upon which we focus. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
First we notice from column (1) that the preferred size of the public sector is 
negatively correlated with the conservative stance on the moral values issue. In other 
words, the more conservative a voter is on the moral values issue, the less liberal he or 
she is on the size of the public sector. But at the same time we notice that this effect is 
different across party identification. Republicans, for instance, have a very strong 
negative effect (column (3)) while Democrats have no statistically significant effect 
(column (2)). 
Second, column (4) examines the determinants of the stance on the moral values 
issue. As we expect, it is negatively correlated with the thermometer feelings on feminists 
and homosexuals, and positively correlated with religiosity. At the same time, we notice 
that it is also positively correlated with antiblack affect, although the coefficient is 
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marginally significant. Thus what we observe as the stance on moral values incorporates 
part of racism. There could be two possible interpretations for this.  
First, our constructed variable on the moral values issue may be impure in that it 
contains other elements than moral values.  
Second, it may be the case that the moral value issues that Republicans have 
emphasized may not be truly related with moralism; it may be a political cover or a code 
word for politically unacceptable issues, such as racism.  
We do not think that there is an easy way of solving this problem.   
 
3. The model 
 
A. The model of political equilibrium 
We model the 2004 presidential election as a political competition between two 
parties who compete on a two- dimensional policy space, which, in our application will 
be the size of the public sector and the policy towards moral values.  The model of 
political competition employed here is that of party unanimity Nash equilibrium with 
endogenous parties (PUNE) as defined in Roemer (2001, Chapter 13).  Unlike the model 
of Downs, in our model, parties will generically propose distinct policies in equilibrium.  
We briefly review the concept of party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE). 
The PUNE model attempts to explain observed political equilibria in general 
elections with single or multi-dimensional policy spaces.  The data of the model are (1) a 
set of  voter types, H;  (2) a probability distribution of the voter types, F,  describing the 
composition of the polity; (3) a policy space , T, over which political competition takes 
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place between parties, and (4) a utility function which describes, for every voter type, its 
preferences over policies, v(t;h) . Thus, the data are summarized by a tuple ( , , , )H T vF . 
For each probability measure F, we will denote the associated distribution function by F 
and its density by f. (Do not confuse the distribution function F with the probability 
measure F.) We fix the number of parties, exogenously, to be two. 
The equilibrium will then consist in a tuple (D,R,τD,τR) where: 
(1) (D,R) is a partition of the set of voter types into party memberships or constituencies: 
i.e., ,D R H D R∪ = ∩ = ∅ ; and 
(2) τ J ∈ T  is the equilibrium platform of party J, for J=D,R. 
(There will be no confusion if we refer to a party and its constituency by the same 
variable: e.g, R for Republican.) 
It is important to note that constituencies are endogenous: they are engendered by 
the data of the model.  Thus, the formation of parties and the policies ultimately proposed 
are the consequence of voter preferences.   Of course the model does not endogenize 
everthing: the number of parties is taken as given, the policy space is given, and the fact 
that parties contain the factions described below is also given. 
For our application, a voter’s type will be an ordered pair h=(θ,ρ) where [0,1]θ ∈  
is the voter’s ideal size of the public sector (which we sometimes call, for short, her ‘tax 
rate’) and [0,1]ρ ∈  is her position on the moral values issue.   The policy space T is a set 
of ordered pairs τ=(t,r), which we may take to be the unit square, where t is a party’s 
policy on the size of the public sector and r is its policy on the values issue.    
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We assume that the utility function of the polity is a weighted Euclidean distance 
function v : T × H → R:  
  2 2( , ; , ) ( ) 2 ( )( ) ( )v t r t t r rθ ρ θ β θ ρ γ ρ= − − − − − − − ,           (1) 
where 0γ > . We also impose the condition 2γ β>  to ensure that the utility function is 
concave. For a reason that will be explained below, we assume that the utility functions v 
are cardinally measurable and unit-comparable.  
Note that in vector notation, this function is identical to: 
1
( , ; , ) ( , )
t
v t r t r
r
β θθ ρ θ ρ β γ ρ
−  = − − −   −   ,                           (2) 
where 
1 β
β γ
     is a weight matrix. We refer to γ as the relative salience the issue of 
moral values, and assume it is positive. The off-diagonal term β , on the other hand, is an 
interaction term, which can be either positive or negative. (If β  is zero, then the utility 
function is separable.) This term measures how much the voter’s evaluation of changes in 
one issue depends on the expected level of another issue.  To see this, suppose we fix t at 
a certain level, t , and choose r for each voter that maximizes her utility; call it ( ; , )r t θ ρ) . 
Then it can be shown that ( , , ) ( )r t tβθ ρ ρ θγ− = − −
) .  Thus if β  is negative, then we 
have positive complementarity between the two issues. If it is positive, then we have 
negative complementarity. (See Figure 1.) Whether the utility function exhibits positive 
or negative complementarity is an empirical matter, which cannot be determined a priori. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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 Given two policies ( , )D Rτ τ  proposed by the two parties, we define ( , )D Rϕ τ τ  as 
the fraction of the polity who prefer the policy τD  to the policy τR . In our model, if the 
policies are distinct, then the set of voters indifferent between two policies will always 
have F-measure zero. 
 A party possesses entrepreneurs or organizers, and members or constituents.  The 
members of a party are citizens who, in equilibrium, prefer that party’s policy to the 
policy of the other party.   The entrepreneurs are professional politicians who make 
policy in the party.   Think of them as a very small group of individuals, who are not 
identified as citizens characterized by a type.  (Their type is irrelevant.) We will assume 
that the organizers of the Democratic and Republican parties are each divided into two 
factions – an Opportunist faction and a Militant faction.   The Opportunist faction wishes, 
in the party competition game, to propose a policy that will maximize the party’s vote 
share, or probability of winning.  The Militant faction wishes to propose a policy that will 
maximize the average welfare of the party’s constituency.     
 The proposal that parties consist of bargaining factions captures the view that 
parties have conflicting goals: to represent constituencies, and to win office, or, more 
generally, to maximize vote share.  Mathematically, the virtue of the factional model of 
parties is that it engenders the existence of political equilibria when policy spaces are 
multi-dimensional. 
 Without loss of generality, we could postulate a third faction in each party – a 
Reformist faction, whose members desire to maximize the average expected welfare of 
the party’s constituency.   As is shown in Roemer (2001), the set of equilibria will not 
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change with this additional faction: in an appropriate sense, the Reformists are a ‘convex 
combination’ of the other two factions.  Therefore we have dispensed with it, and also 
with having to define the probability of victory, which would be essential, were we have 
to discuss expected utility of voters, something of concern to Reformists. 
 We mention the Reformists because postulating their existence adds an important 
element of realism to the model, although, it turns out, it does not alter the model’s 
equilibria. Thus, from the formal viewpoint, we may ignore Reformists3. 
 The idea of PUNE is that parties compete against each other strategically, as in 
Nash equlibrium, and factions bargain with each other, inside parties.   At an equilibrium, 
each party’s platform is a best response to the other party’s platform in the sense that it is 
a bargaining solution between the party’s factions, given the platform proposed by the 
other party.     
 Suppose the members of a party consist of all citizens whose types lie in the set 
J ⊂ H .   We define the average welfare function for this party as a function mapping 
from T to the real numbers defined by: 
( ) ( ; ) ( )J
h J
V v h d hτ τ
∈
= ∫ F .                                 (3) 
That is, VJ(τ)  is just (a constant times) the average utility of the coalition J at the policy τ.   
(For equation (3) to make sense, we must assume that the utility functions v are unit-
comparable.) 
                                                 
3 The reader may be puzzled that adding the Reformist faction does not change the 
equilibrium set.  Adding them does change something, however: the interpretation of the 
bargaining powers of the factions associated with particular equilibria.  Thus, we do not 
say that Reformists don’t matter: it is just that they do not matter for the present analysis. 
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 Suppose the two parties propose policies and D Rτ τ .    Define: 
( , ) { | ( , ) ( , )}D R D Rh H v h v hτ τ τ τΩ = ∈ > .                             (4) 
Then the share of the polity who (should) vote for the D policy is: 
( , ) ( ( , ))D R D Rt tϕ τ τ = ΩF .                                              (5) 
  
Definition A party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) for the model (H,F,T,v) is (a) a 
partition of the set of types H D R= ∪ ,  possibly ignoring a set of measure zero; and (b) 
a pair of policies ( , )D Rτ τ such that: 
(1a)  Given Dτ  there is no policy τ ∈ T  such that: 
( ) ( ) and ( , ) ( , )R R R D D RV Vτ τ ϕ τ τ ϕ τ τ≥ ≤  
with at least one of these inequalities strict; 
(1b) Given τ R  there is no policy τ ∈ T  such that: 
( ) ( ) and ( , ) ( , )D D D R D RV Vτ τ ϕ τ τ ϕ τ τ≥ ≥  
with at least one of these inequalities strict; 
(2) for J=D,R,  every member of coalition J prefers policy τJ to the other policy, that is  
h ∈ J ⇒ v(τ J ,h) > v(τ ′ J ,h) for ′ J ≠ J . 
  
 Condition (1a) states that, when facing the policy τD, there is no feasible policy 
that would increase both the average welfare of party R’s constituents and the vote 
fraction of party R.  Thus, we may view policy τR  as being a bargaining solution between 
party R’s two factions when facing the opposition’s policy, as the Militants’ desire to 
maximize the average welfare of constituents, and the Opportunists desire to maximize 
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vote share.     All we employ here is the assumption that a bargain must be Pareto 
efficient for the two players in the bargaining game.  Condition (1b) similarly states that 
policy τD is a bargaining solution for party D’s factions when facing the policy τR.  
Condition (2) states that the endogenous party memberships are stable: each party 
member prefers her party’s policy to the other parties’ policies. 
 There are two ‘free’ parameters in this equilibrium concept: one might think that 
the relative strength of the Militants with respect to the Opportunists in a party is an 
important variable, in determining where on the mini-Pareto frontier of the factions the 
bargaining solution lies.   There is one such parameter for each party D and R.  Thus, we 
can expect that, if there an equilibrium, there will be a two-parameter manifold of 
equilibria, where the elements in this manifold are associated with different pairs of 
relative bargaining strengths of the pairs of factions in D and R.  This indeed turns out to 
be the case, as we will see below. 
 With differentiability, we can characterize a PUNE as the solution of a system of 
simultaneous equations.  Denote by ( , )D RJϕ τ τ∇  the gradient of the function ϕ  with 
respect to the policy τ J .   Denote by ∇V J  the gradient of VJ.    Then, we can write the 
necessary conditions for a PUNE where τD and τR  are interior points in T as: 
 (1a) there is a non-negative number x such that 
( , ) ( )D R D DD x Vϕ τ τ τ−∇ = ∇                              (6) 
 (1b) there is a non-negative number y such that  
( , ) ( )D R R RR y Vϕ τ τ τ∇ = ∇ .                         (7) 
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Condition (1a) says that the gradients of the vote share function and the average welfare 
function for party D point in opposite directions, and so, assuming local convexity, there 
is no direction in which the policy of the party can be altered so as to increase both the 
party’s vote share and the average welfare of the party’s constituents.    Thus conditions 
(1a) and (1b) correspond exactly to the conditions (1a) and (1b) in the definition of 
PUNE.   
 Our next task is to characterize PUNE as a system of equations, which requires us 
to formulate precisely the party constituencies.  Denote the set of types who prefer a 
policy ( , )D D Dt rτ =  to policy ( , )R R Rt rτ =  by ( , )D Rτ τΩ , and compute that  
{( , ) | ( , , ) if ( ) ( ) 0
( , )
{( , ) | ( , , ) if ( ) ( ) 0
D R D R D R
D R
D R D R D R
H t t r r
H t t r r
θ ρ ρ ψ τ τ θ β γτ τ θ ρ ρ ψ τ τ θ β γ
 ∈ > − + − >Ω =  ∈ < − + − <
        (8) 
where  
( )2 2 2 2( ) ( ) (( ) ( ) ) 2 ( )( ) ( )( , , )
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( )
D R D R D D R RR D R D
D R
D R D R D R D R
t t r r t r t rt t r r
t t r r t t r r
γ ββψ τ τ θ θβ γ β γ
− + − + −− + −= +− + − − + − .   (9) 
We will specify the values of the policies t and r so that larger t means more liberal in 
economic issues and larger r means more conservative in value issues.   Thus, at 
equilibrium, we will expect that D Rt t> , D Rr r<  and ( ) ( ) 0D R D Rt t r rβ γ− + − < .   For 
an equilibrium with this characteristic, it follows from (8) that the constituency D will be 
precisely: 
{( , ) | ( , , )}D RD Hθ ρ ρ ψ τ τ θ= ∈ < ,                                (10) 
for these are the types who will prefer policy τL to both other policies.  R , of course, 
comprises the remaining types (except for a set of measure zero). See Figure 2. 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 Thus we can write: 
( , )
( ) ( , )dF
ψ τ θ
ϕ τ θ ρ
∞
−∞ −∞
= ∫ ∫ ,                                            (11) 
where the inside integral is over ρ and the outside integral is over θ.  Similarly, we can 
write: 
( , , )
( ) ( ; , ) ( , ),
D R
D D DV v dF
ψ τ τ θ
τ τ θ ρ θ ρ
∞
−∞ −∞
= ∫ ∫                   (12) 
( , , )
( ) ( ; , ) ( , )
D R
R R RV v dF
ψ τ τ θ
τ τ θ ρ θ ρ
∞ ∞
−∞
= ∫ ∫ .                  (13) 
 Now we substitute these expressions into the first-order conditions (FOC), and we 
have fully modeled PUNE – that is, condition (2) of the definition of PUNE holds by 
construction.    
 The first-order conditions now comprise four equations in six unknowns – the 
four policy unknowns of the Left and Right parties, and the two Lagrangian multipliers x 
and y.   If there is a solution, there will (generically) be, therefore, a two- parameter 
family of solutions.  As we described above, the points in this family or manifold can be 
viewed as corresponding to equilibria associated with different relative bargaining 
strengths of the pairs of factions in the parties L and R.  
In general, there are many equilibria of the model.   But in the empirical work that 
we have carried out over the past five years, it is heartening to learn that these equilibria 
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are quite concentrated in the policy space (in all the important applications).  Thus, we do 
not lose much predictive power by virtue of the multiplicity of equilibria.    
That multiplicity, which is two-dimensional  (regardless of the dimension of the 
policy space), is due to our not specifying the relative bargaining strengths of the internal 
factions within the parties.   In other words, if we could specify what those bargaining 
strengths were, we could pin down unique equilibria.  Indeed, at any PUNE, we can 
compute the associated relative bargaining powers of the Opportunists and Militants in 
each party.   We model the bargaining game within the parties as a Nash bargaining game 
with threat points.  The details of the game and the computation of bargaining powers are 
presented in Roemer (2001, Chapter 8).  The relative bargaining power of the Militants in 
Democrats at at PUNE ( , )D Rτ τ  is given by 
( ( ) ( ))
( , ) ( ( ) ( ))
D D D R
D R D D D R
x V V
x V V
τ τ
ϕ τ τ τ τ
−
+ − ,                                  (14) 
where x solves equation (6), and the relative bargaining power of the Militants in 
Republicans is given by 
( ( ) ( ))
1 ( , ) ( ( ) ( ))
R R R D
D R R R R D
y V V
y V V
τ τ
ϕ τ τ τ τ
−
− + − ,                             (15) 
where y is the solution of equation (7). 
 Unfortunately, we do not have good data on these relative bargaining strengths.   
(Indeed, there probably is no formal bargaining game taking place within parties: our 
model is meant to capture the idea that the setting of policies by parties reflects both vote-
maximizing and constituency-representing aims.) One way that we can refine the set of 
equilibria is to fit the model to the observed data in various ways: for instance, by 
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restricting ourselves to equilibria that generate the observed vote shares for a particular 
election.   This essentially eliminates one degree of freedom from the equilibrium set. 
We have recently completed an analysis of how the race issue impacted the 
degree of income taxation in the US, during the period 1972-1992.  (See Lee and Roemer 
(2004).)   Along with Karine Van der Straeten, we have extended this analysis to three 
other countries – the UK, Denmark and France, which will be published as a book, 
tentatively entitled Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution.  In this analysis, we posited 
either two or three parties, as was appropriate for the particular country, and a two-
dimensional policy space, consisting of the economic issue, and the race or immigration 
issue.   We calibrated the model to the country at hand, and then conducted some 
counterfactual calculations to understand the degree to which the race/immigration issue 
affects the equilibrium on the economic issue.  In all cases, we conclude that the effect is 
significant.  In the US, we compute that the income tax rate would be approximately ten 
percentage points higher, were racism absent from American voters’ worldviews.   
 Our work on this problem illustrates the tractability of the PUNE model – indeed, 
its capacity to track extremely closely the electoral experience in these countries.   We 
conclude from this work that the conceptualization of parties as consisting of bargaining 
factions appears to be a fertile one, at least in the pragmatic sense of producing a model 
that tracks reality well, without having to postulate many exogenous parameters to 
achieve a good fit of model to data. 
 
B. The policy bundle (PB) and moral Puritanism (MP) effects 
The two counterfactual experiments are carried out in the following way. 
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The first counterfactual experiment is done by assuming that the issue of moral 
values (r) is not an issue in the election (thus parties compete over the single issue of the 
size of the public sector, t), although voters continue to possess the same joint distribution 
described by ( , )F θ ρ . (In actual calculations, we set (1 )obs obsD Rr r rϕ ϕ= + − .)  Thus it 
continues to be the case, in this counterfactual contest, that voters’ views on values will 
affect the political equilibrium, directly via their effect on preferences on party 
constituents and indirectly via their effect on preferences over size of the public sector. If 
we call t J  an equilibrium public sector size for party J in the full model and tI
J  an 
equilibrium public sector size for party J in this counterfactual, then the difference tI
J − t J  
is exactly a measure of the policy-bundle effect.  
The second counterfactual is then carried out by estimating a distribution of 
value-weak preference for the public sector.  We have seen that Republicans had a 
significant anti-state effect of values while Democrats had no such an effect. We estimate 
what the distribution of preferences over the size of the public sector would be, had 
Republican voters the anti-state effect of values of the average population, which is 
obtained by running the regression over the entire population. Call the value-weak 
preference for the public sector 'θ .  We now run a second unidimensional election, on 
the size of the public sector, where we assume that the distribution of voter preferences 
on the tax issue is given by '( , )G θ ρ  and that the issue of moral values (r) is not an issue 
in the election.   The results of this election will be sterilized of both the policy-bundle 
and the moral Puritarism effects.   If we summarize the policy of the PUNEs here 
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calculated by tII
J  then we say that the total effect of moral value is tII
J − t J , and the moral 
Puritarism effect is J JII It t− . In other words, 
 
 
 
The order of decomposition is not unique, however.  Consider the following third 
experiment. Suppose we assume that the joint distribution is given by '( , )G θ ρ  and run a 
two dimensional election with this counterfactual distribution. If we call 'JIIt  an 
equilibrium public sector size for party J in this counterfactual, then the difference 
'
J J
II
t t−  is exactly a measure of the moral Puritanism effect, and the difference 'J JII IIt t−  is a 
measure of the policy bundle effect. We call the decomposition method according to the 
first order ‘Method 1,’ while that according to the second order ‘Method 2.’ Because the 
order of decomposition is arbitrary, we take the average of the effects obtained from the 
two methods. Figure 3 illustrates the two methods of decomposition schematically. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
4. Numerical computation  
 
In the numerical computation, we will assume that the distribution of voter types 
is given by a five-parameter bivariate Beta distribution specified in Gupta and Wong 
   Total effect
PB effect
MP effect 
J J
II
J J
I
J J
II I
t t
t t
t t
−
= −
+ −
 - 23 -
(1985). More specifically, the joint probability density function of the bivariate Beta 
distribution we use is given by 
( )2 21 2
1 1
( , ) ( ; , ) 1 2 ( ; , ) 1j j j j j j
j j
f h h g h a b G h a bλ
= =
  = + −    ∏ ∏ ,            (16) 
where 1 1 [0,1]
1( ; , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( , )
j ja b
j j j j j j
j j
g h a b h h h
B a b
− −= − I  is a univariate Beta density, 
( ; , )j j jG h a b  is the distribution function of ( ; , )j j jg h a b , and  0, 0, 1j ja b λ> > ≤ . It has 
been shown that the parameter λ  is proportional to the coefficient of correlation between 
1h  and 2h . We denote the distribution function of f  by F. Gupta and Wong (1985) 
derive the following formula for joint moments of the bivariate Beta distribution: 
1 2
2 2
1 1
1 2 3 2
1 1
,1 , 22 (2 , )( ) ( ) ( ) * ( |1) 1 ,
1, 2( , ) ( , )
i i i in nn n i i i
i i
i i i i i ii i i i i i
a b n aB a n bE h h E h E h F
a n a ba B a b B a n b
λ
= =
− + += + − + + ++ ∏ ∏
where 1 1
11
1
( )
,..., ( )( | )
,..., ( ) !
( )
p
ni
p i i
p q q
nq i
i i
x n zx x xF z
y y y n n
y
∞ =
=
=
Γ +
Γ= Γ +
Γ
∏∑ ∏
 is the hypergeometric function. This formula 
allows us to compute the means and the variances of the two marginal distribution 
functions and the covariance between the two variables. Thus 
i
i
i i
aEh
a b
=
+
,                                               (17) 
2( ) ( ) ( 1)
i i
i
i i i i
a bVar h
a b a b
=
+ + +
,                              (18) 
and 
2
1 2 3 2
1
,1 ,1 22 (2 1, )( , ) * ( |1) 1
1,1 2( , ) ( 1, )
i i ii i i
i i i ii i i i i i i
a b aa B a bCov h h F
a a ba b a B a b B a b
λ
=
− + += − + + ++ + ∏ .  (19) 
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By comparing them with the empirical means, variances, and covariance, we can 
determine the values of 1 1 2 2( , , , , )a b a b λ . 
Figure 4 shows the estimated beta densities and a non-parametrically estimated 
densities (a kernel method with the Silverman’s optimal bandwidth). As is clear from the 
figure, the fit is extremely good. Using a non-parametric joint density in numerical 
computations is possible, but extremely expensive in terms of the computation time 
required; thus we use the Beta distribution. The joint density and its contour plot are 
shown is Figure 5. As we expect, the two dimensions are negatively correlated. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
We also computed the density of the value-weak preference for the public sector. 
As is shown in Figure 6, the Beta fit is not bad for the counterfactual distribution as well. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
We do not know the empirical values of γ  and β . Thus we varied the value of γ  
from 0.8 to 1.6 and for each value of γ  we chose the value of β  that minimizes 
( , , , )D R D Robs obs obs obs obst t R Rϕ ϕ− . The values of 'sβ  computed in this way are all negative; 
thus the utility function exhibits positive complementarity. (See Figure 1 again.) 
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Out of the four models described in Figure 3, two of them are two-dimensional 
models (i.e., the full model and model 21) while the other two are one-dimensional 
models (i.e., model 12 and model 22). For the full model and model 21, we use equations 
(6)-(7), which form a system of 4 equations in 6 unknowns (the four policy variables and 
the two Lagrangean multipliers). Consequently, we can expect to find a 2-manifold of 
solutions in these models if there are any solutions. We started the computation by 
(randomly) choosing a pair of rD and rR (with rD < rR); we solve the four equations for tD, 
tR, x, and y for the chosen values of rD and rR. In the computation we checked whether (1) 
the root found by the computer satisfies the four first-order conditions, (2) the 
indifference curves of party factions are indeed tangent to each other for both parties, and 
(3) x and y are nonnegative. For the two counterfactual models, we (randomly) choose a 
pair of tD and tR solving the two equations ,
( , , ) ( , )D R D Dobs obs obs
D D
t t r r V t r
t t
ϕ∂ ∂− =∂ ∂  and 
,( , , ) ( , )
D R R R
obs obs obs
R R
t t r r V t r
t t
ϕ∂ ∂=∂ ∂  for x and y, while checking whether 0x ≥  and  
0y ≥  hold.  
For the two-dimensional models, we keep running the computer until it finds at 
least 60 PUNEs. For the one-dimensional models, we did 300 random samplings, which 
usually finds 100-150 PUNEs. Running the two-dimensional models is more time-
consuming than running the one-dimensional models. 
We did not use all these PUNEs in computing our decomposition effects. We 
adopted the following procedure. First, out of the 60 PUNEs in the full model, we 
selected those whose (equilibrium) vote share is within 10% of the observed vote share. 
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Then we computed the average bargaining powers of these equilibria. Finally for the 
other three models, we chose those equilibria whose bargaining powers are close to the 
average bargaining powers of the selected equilibria in the full model. This means that 
we are controlling for the effect of a change in bargaining powers.  As we view the 
relative bargaining powers of the factions as our missing data, it seems to us that this 
makes good sense.  This does not mean that we think the actual bargaining powers would 
not change. It means we are interested in the pure effects of MPE and PBE, not the 
combination of these effects and the effect of a change in bargaining powers. 
In Figure 7, we report the equilibrium values of PUNEs for the full model with 
different sets of ( , )γ β . We use blue dots to denote the equilibrium policy vectors for 
party D and red dots to denote those for party R. The big rectangles denote the observed 
policies of the two parties, while big dots represent the average equilibrium policies of 
the two parties. The mid size dots represent the ideal policies of the militants in the two 
parties, while the smallest dots the individual PUNEs. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Table 3 shows the results for all different combinations of ( , )γ β  and their 
decompositions according to the two methods described in section 3. The average 
policies are the averages of the policies of the two parties.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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First, we note that the equilibrium policies are differentiated between the two 
parties. When ( , ) (1.4, 0.6)γ β = − , for instance, the Democratic Party proposes 
0.59Dt =  while the Republican Party proposes 0.47Rt = . 
The effect of moral values on redistribution in the United States is small if γ  is 
low, while it is large if γ  is high. This is not surprising because γ  measures the relative 
salience of moral values.  If ( , ) (1.4, 0.6)γ β = − , we predict that the Republican Party 
would have proposed 0.57Rt = , absent the issues of moral values. Due to the existence 
of values, however, the Republican Party was able to propose 0.47Rt = ; thus the effect 
of values on the size of the public sector is about 21 % (0.10/0.47) for the Republican 
Party. This is about 56% of the standard deviations of the distribution of ideal points of 
the tax rate. The effect of values on the size of the public sector for the Democratic Party 
is also large. Absent values, we predict party D would have proposed 0.68Dt = ; due to 
the existence of values, it proposed 0.59Dt = . If ( , ) (0.8, 0.21)γ β = − , on the other 
hand, the effect of values on the size of the public sector is about 24 % of the standard 
deviations of the distribution of ideal points of the tax rate for the Republican Party and 
16% for the Democratic Party. 
When we decompose the total effect into the two effects that we suggested earlier, 
we notice that the moral Puritanism effect is generally positive, regardless of whether the 
value of γ  is low or high. The policy bundle effect, on the other hand, is positive if the 
issue of moral values is sufficiently salient ( 1.4 1.6γ = ∼ ) while it is negative if it is not 
salient ( 0.8 1.2γ = ∼ ). 
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Figure 8 shows the equilibrium voter separation for the four models that we 
described in Figure 3, juxtaposed on the contour plots of the beta densities. Each straight 
line in these figures demarcates the types who, at equilibrium, vote Republican from the 
types who vote Democratic. The space of the plots in Figure 8 is ( , )θ ρ . Those types 
‘below’ a line are Democrats, while those ‘above’ are Republicans. To be precise, each 
line is the graph of equation (9) above for one of the elections. (Note that Ψ  is a linear 
function of θ  in equation (9).) For each pair of parameter values, the first panel shows 
the voter separation for the full model and model 12 and the second panel shows the voter 
separation for model 21 and model 22. The beta density in the first panel is that with the 
actual preference for the size of the public sector while the beta density in the second 
panel is that with the counterfactual value-weak preference for the size of the public 
sector. In both panels, the flatter separation curves are those for the two-dimensional 
models (i.e., the full model and model 21) and the steeper ones are those for the one-
dimensional models (i.e., model 12 and model 22). Thus the presence of the issue of 
moral values makes the US politics less class-oriented. 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There has been much useful work in political science that is relevant to the 
question that we pose.  Almost all of this work, however, has been descriptive, in the 
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sense that it searches for correlations between voter preferences and observed political 
outcomes.   A multiple regression is only, after all, a correlation.   
 No statistical exercise of correlation, regardless of its sophistication, can answer 
adequately the kind of counterfactual question in which we are interested.   For when we 
ask, “Why can  the Republican Party propose an extremist economic policy and receive 
half the votes?” we are in fact asking, “What difference from the present reality would 
force the Republican Party to propose a much less extremist economic policy to remain a 
political player?”   Questions such as this cannot be answered by observing correlations; 
they require a model of the social mechanism that connects voter views to political 
outcomes.   The venue is party competition, and hence, we believe, a full model of party 
formation and competition is needed to analyze the problem. 
 We, as a social science, are only in the beginning stages of describing complex 
party competition with precise mathematical models.   Doubtless our work will appear 
primitive in fifty years’ time --  we hope, in sooner than that.  We do, however, believe 
that the project we have proposed involves a vital methodological step forward.   
We briefly comment on the future research that might study what we proposed to 
use the PUNE model to study the relative importance of the three bulleted explanations, 
in the introduction. The procedure will again be to compute equilibria of the model under 
various counterfactual assumptions.     
Ideally, we may define the set of voter types H as having many dimensions, which 
would be necessary to characterize voter preferences over many issues – say the 
economic issue, the ‘values’ issue, the ‘race’ issue, and foreign policy.  Unfortunately, 
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working with such a large dimensional policy space would be intractable unless one uses 
a low level programming language such as C or Fortran.  
One question we are concerned with is whether the most important secondary 
issue, in so far as explaining the conservative economic policy of the Republican Party is 
concerned, is the ‘race’ issue or the ‘values’ issue – or, more generally, whether one of 
these issues is important at all.  For the period 1972-1992, we believe that we have 
demonstrated the importance of the race issue (Lee and Roemer, 2004).   Today, however, 
the ‘values’ issue may be more important.  To study this, we would specify a three-
dimensional space of voter types, enabling us to represent voter preferences on the 
economic issue, the race issue and the ‘values’ issue. We would then conduct 
counterfactual experiments of the following sort: How would the equilibrium change if 
race were not an issue in the election; how would it change if values were not an issue in 
the election?   Recall, that by a change in the equilibrium, we mean a change in party 
constituencies and party policies.   
 We note that our procedure is more sophisticated than simply estimating, from 
the NES data, the relative salience of these issues for voters: we have a full equilibrium 
model that tells us how party constituencies would change, and consequent party policies 
would change, were these issues to disappear from the electoral arena.  The results of this 
kind of general-equilibrium computation are not related in any obvious way to the 
relative saliences that these issues have for voters4. (It may be that the issue with larger 
                                                 
4 There is a distinction between two kinds of counterfactual: in one, we assume that an 
issue, such as race, is not present in the electoral contest, but voters continue to care 
about race, and that influences their views on other issues; in another, we assume that 
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salience has less effect on the equilibrium on economic policy than the third issue, 
because of the correlation of voter views on the three issues.) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
racism ceases to characterize the worldviews of voters.   We will not pursue this 
distinction further in this proposal, although we will, in the project. 
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Table 1: Probit regressions for the Republican vote share 
 
 (1) (2) 
 voteR voteR 
publicsize -2.729** -1.071** 
 (2.92) (2.92) 
moralvalue 3.475* 1.364* 
 (2.51) (2.51) 
raceissue 2.902* 1.139* 
 (2.52) (2.52) 
biggovt 0.595* 0.233* 
 (2.17) (2.17) 
iraqwarissue 7.347** 2.884** 
 (6.71) (6.71) 
taxcutissue 3.014** 1.183** 
 (4.10) (4.10) 
ssreform 0.422** 0.166** 
 (2.69) (2.69) 
schoolvouchers 0.171 0.067 
 (1.09) (1.09) 
environmentissue -0.754 -0.296 
 (1.03) (1.03) 
age -0.009 -0.004 
 (0.87) (0.87) 
educatio -0.033 -0.013 
 (0.34) (0.34) 
income_hh (10k) 0.042 0.017 
 (0.99) (0.99) 
blackdummy -1.902** -0.590** 
 (3.83) (3.83) 
femaledummy -0.046 -0.018 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
marrieddummy -0.157 -0.062 
 (0.58) (0.58) 
uniondummy -0.166 -0.066 
 (0.51) (0.51) 
usparentsdummy 0.559 0.220 
 (1.55) (1.55) 
family_military -0.405 -0.156 
 (1.35) (1.35) 
unemployeddummy 0.452 0.172 
 (1.31) (1.31) 
pastfinancial 0.202 0.079 
 (1.23) (1.23) 
futurefinancial -0.477+ -0.187+ 
 (1.96) (1.96) 
pasteconomy 0.275 0.108 
 (1.56) (1.56) 
futureeconomy 0.152 0.060 
 (0.73) (0.73) 
religiosity 0.452 0.177 
 (0.51) (0.51) 
Constant -7.291**  
 (4.70)  
Observations 411 411 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 2: Determinants of the Size of the Public Sector and the Moral Values 
 (1)All (2)Democrats (3)Republicans (4)All 
 publicsize publicsize publicsize moralvalue3 
biggovt -0.077** -0.050* -0.089** 0.004 
 (5.91) (2.37) (5.05) (0.51) 
moralvalue -0.337** -0.124 -0.431**  
 (4.58) (1.03) (3.79)  
antiblackaffect -0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.001+ 
 (0.26) (1.55) (0.49) (1.92) 
therm_poor 0.002** 0.001* 0.001+ 0.001** 
 (4.13) (2.29) (1.75) (2.68) 
therm_feminists 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 
 (4.01) (2.78) (0.43) (6.53) 
therm_homosexuals -0.001+ -0.001 -0.000 -0.001** 
 (1.89) (1.38) (0.92) (8.25) 
therm_southerners -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
 (2.18) (0.05) (2.19) (1.39) 
age -0.001+ -0.001 -0.001 0.001** 
 (1.79) (1.33) (1.38) (4.08) 
education -0.006 -0.000 -0.015* -0.008** 
 (1.30) (0.01) (2.37) (3.30) 
income_hh (10k) -0.005* -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (2.48) (0.98) (1.13) (1.25) 
blackdummy 0.014 -0.004 0.039 -0.019+ 
 (0.76) (0.15) (0.88) (1.79) 
femaledummy 0.002 -0.022 0.028 -0.020** 
 (0.13) (1.14) (1.50) (2.90) 
marrieddummy 0.022 0.017 0.029 0.022** 
 (1.57) (0.79) (1.37) (3.06) 
uniondummy 0.003 0.007 0.005 -0.000 
 (0.26) (0.36) (0.22) (0.04) 
unemployeddummy 0.017 0.027 0.015 0.004 
 (1.22) (1.10) (0.66) (0.46) 
pastfinancial -0.024** -0.020* -0.014 0.005 
 (3.58) (2.03) (1.10) (1.26) 
futurefinancial 0.005 0.009 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.58) (0.68) (0.11) (0.50) 
pasteconomy -0.032** -0.012 -0.024+ 0.010* 
 (3.64) (0.77) (1.90) (2.03) 
futureeconomy -0.007 0.009 0.000 0.004 
 (0.82) (0.69) (0.01) (0.75) 
religiosity -0.021 -0.092 0.111+ 0.233** 
 (0.49) (1.46) (1.82) (10.00) 
trust -0.032** -0.043* -0.007 -0.007 
 (2.63) (2.20) (0.38) (1.01) 
constant 0.768** 0.688** 0.845** 0.390** 
 (14.59) (8.21) (9.12) (16.37) 
Observations 594 231 239 720 
R-squared 0.39 0.22 0.36 0.52 
Adj R-squared     
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: PUNEs and the decomposition effects  
( 0.8, 0.21γ β= = − ) 
Full Model 12 Model 21 Model 22 Observed
BPD 0.339206 0.26508 0.275152 0.262366 NA
BPR 0.307897 0.347609 0.334008 0.306647 NA
tD 0.594132 0.551025 0.604934 0.622341 0.62
tR 0.474849 0.42255 0.504866 0.518561 0.39
RD 0.438027 NA 0.461005 NA 0.34
RR 0.484764 NA 0.487175 NA 0.54
tAVE 0.532559 0.495335 0.561209 0.575715 0.501515
ϕ 0.485656 0.565547 0.583272 0.543194 0.484848
 
 
Democratic 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.043107 0.0174069 −0.0128501
% s.d. −24.0419 9.70826 −7.1668
MPE 0.0713167 0.0108028 0.0410598
% s.d. 39.7751 6.02498 22.9
PBE
TOT x100 −152.809 61.7054 −45.552
MPE
TOT x 100 252.809 38.2946 145.552
 
Republican 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.0522989 0.0136946 −0.0193022
% s.d. −29.1684 7.6378 −10.7653
MPE 0.0960106 0.0300171 0.0630139
% s.d. 53.5475 16.7413 35.1444
PBE
TOT x100 −119.645 31.3293 −44.1579
MPE
TOT x 100 219.645 68.6707 144.158
 
Average 
Policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.0372245 0.0145064 −0.011359
% s.d. −20.761 8.09057 −6.33522
MPE 0.0803804 0.0286495 0.054515
% s.d. 44.8301 15.9785 30.4043
PBE
TOT x100 −86.2558 33.6139 −26.3209
MPE
TOT x 100 186.256 66.3861 126.321
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Table 3 (Continued): PUNEs and the decomposition effects  
( 1.0, 0.30γ β= = − ) 
 
Full Model 12 Model 21 Model 22 Observed
BPD 0.389088 0.303383 0.325135 0.299505 NA
BPR 0.368597 0.371428 0.328698 0.362057 NA
tD 0.597672 0.559066 0.640493 0.612459 0.62
tR 0.464476 0.407982 0.54586 0.488664 0.39
RD 0.428503 NA 0.440007 NA 0.34
RR 0.495531 NA 0.488379 NA 0.54
tAVE 0.530003 0.491472 0.594803 0.558208 0.501515
ϕ 0.491639 0.557873 0.500264 0.571921 0.484848
 
 
  
  
Democratic 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.0386068 −0.0280337 −0.0333202
% s.d. −21.5319 −15.6351 −18.5835
MPE 0.0533936 0.0428205 0.0481071
% s.d. 29.7789 23.882 26.8305
PBE
TOT x100 −261.089 −189.585 −225.337
MPE
TOT x 100 361.089 289.585 325.337
 
Republican 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.0564945 −0.0571956 −0.0568451
% s.d. −31.5084 −31.8994 −31.7039
MPE 0.0806823 0.0813833 0.0810328
% s.d. 44.9985 45.3895 45.194
PBE
TOT x100 −233.567 −236.465 −235.016
MPE
TOT x 100 333.567 336.465 335.016
 
Average 
Policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.0385304 −0.036595 −0.0375627
% s.d. −21.4894 −20.4099 −20.9496
MPE 0.0667359 0.0648004 0.0657681
% s.d. 37.2202 36.1408 36.6805
PBE
TOT x100 −136.606 −129.745 −133.176
MPE
TOT x 100 236.606 229.745 233.176
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Table 3 (Continued): PUNEs and the decomposition effects  
( 1.2, 0.57γ β= = − ) 
Full Model 12 Model 21 Model 22 Observed
BPD 0.261542 0.243174 0.266812 0.216057 NA
BPR 0.267292 0.315706 0.258074 0.227213 NA
tD 0.570709 0.525204 0.641292 0.60274 0.62
tR 0.474396 0.395436 0.566851 0.517676 0.39
RD 0.441606 NA 0.436501 NA 0.34
RR 0.491791 NA 0.478175 NA 0.54
tAVE 0.523543 0.468684 0.604939 0.562459 0.501515
ϕ 0.510197 0.584103 0.471218 0.5342 0.484848
 
  
 
Democratic 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.0455043 −0.0385514 −0.0420279
% s.d. −25.3789 −21.5011 −23.44
MPE 0.0775361 0.0705832 0.0740596
% s.d. 43.2438 39.366 41.3049
PBE
TOT x100 −142.06 −120.354 −131.207
MPE
TOT x 100 242.06 220.354 231.207
 
Republican 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.0789594 −0.0491754 −0.0640674
% s.d. −44.0376 −27.4263 −35.732
MPE 0.122239 0.0924554 0.107347
% s.d. 68.1759 51.5646 59.8703
PBE
TOT x100 −182.439 −113.622 −148.03
MPE
TOT x 100 282.439 213.622 248.03
 
Average 
Policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE −0.0548589 −0.0424797 −0.0486693
% s.d. −30.5961 −23.6919 −27.144
MPE 0.0937755 0.0813963 0.0875859
% s.d. 52.3009 45.3967 48.8488
PBE
TOT x100 −140.965 −109.155 −125.06
MPE
TOT x 100 240.965 209.155 225.06
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Table 3 (Continued): PUNEs and the decomposition effects  
( 1.4, 0.6γ β= = − ) 
 
Full Model 12 Model 21 Model 22 Observed
BPD 0.378768 0.319886 0.337967 0.337946 NA
BPR 0.359993 0.25422 0.24951 0.236778 NA
tD 0.592529 0.613614 0.655917 0.678811 0.62
tR 0.469126 0.478783 0.578092 0.570594 0.39
RD 0.428004 NA 0.424388 NA 0.34
RR 0.495673 NA 0.474527 NA 0.54
tAVE 0.529929 0.540737 0.612395 0.617008 0.501515
ϕ 0.49172 0.451919 0.430915 0.413461 0.484848
 
 
Democratic 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE 0.0210846 0.0228946 0.0219896
% s.d. 11.7594 12.7689 12.2641
MPE 0.0651977 0.0633877 0.0642927
% s.d. 36.3623 35.3529 35.8576
PBE
TOT x100 24.4368 26.5345 25.4857
MPE
TOT x 100 75.5632 73.4655 74.5143
 
Republican 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE 0.0096572 −0.00749765 0.00107977
% s.d. 5.38606 −4.18162 0.602216
MPE 0.0918111 0.108966 0.100389
% s.d. 51.2053 60.773 55.9892
PBE
TOT x100 9.51745 −7.38916 1.06415
MPE
TOT x 100 90.4825 107.389 98.9359
 
Average 
Policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE 0.0108085 0.00461301 0.00771076
% s.d. 6.02817 2.57279 4.30048
MPE 0.0762705 0.082466 0.0793683
% s.d. 42.5379 45.9933 44.2656
PBE
TOT x100 12.4123 5.2975 8.8549
MPE
TOT x 100 87.5877 94.7025 91.1451
 
 
 - 40 -
Table 3 (Continued): PUNEs and the decomposition effects  
( 1.6, 0.75γ β= = − ) 
Full Model 12 Model 21 Model 22 Observed
BPD 0.273365 0.284156 0.291151 0.28602 NA
BPR 0.296373 0.221993 0.227285 0.199192 NA
tD 0.573599 0.622957 0.648374 0.672735 0.62
tR 0.474682 0.497724 0.583469 0.577014 0.39
RD 0.436817 NA 0.422606 NA 0.34
RR 0.494432 NA 0.469735 NA 0.54
tAVE 0.526095 0.5548 0.613572 0.618851 0.501515
ϕ 0.506395 0.431657 0.431663 0.416091 0.484848
 
 
Democratic 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE 0.0493585 0.0243619 0.0368602
% s.d. 27.5285 13.5872 20.5578
MPE 0.0497784 0.074775 0.0622767
% s.d. 27.7626 41.7038 34.7332
PBE
TOT x100 49.7883 24.574 37.1811
MPE
TOT x 100 50.2117 75.426 62.8189
 
Republican 
policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE 0.0230429 −0.00645558 0.00829365
% s.d. 12.8516 −3.60043 4.62557
MPE 0.0792893 0.108788 0.0940385
% s.d. 44.2216 60.6736 52.4476
PBE
TOT x100 22.5177 −6.30845 8.10464
MPE
TOT x 100 77.4823 106.308 91.8954
 
Average 
Policies 
Method 1 Method 2 Average
PBE 0.0287043 0.00527847 0.0169914
% s.d. 16.0091 2.94393 9.47652
MPE 0.0640509 0.0874768 0.0757638
% s.d. 35.7227 48.7879 42.2553
PBE
TOT x100 30.9463 5.69075 18.3185
MPE
TOT x 100 69.0537 94.3093 81.6815
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Figure 1: Patterns of complementarity and the shapes of indifference curves 
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Figure 2: Hypothetical voter separation 
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Figure 3: Decomposition of total effects into PBE and MPE 
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Figure 4: Marginal densities of voter types: Non-parametric and parametric 
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Note: We use the optimal bandwidth suggested by Silverman in drawing the kernel 
densities.
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Figure 5: Joint distribution of the size of the public sector and the moral values 
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Note: Estimated parameter values for the bivariate beta distribution is 
1 1 2 2( , , , , ) (3.55,3.21,7.51, 8.65, 0.96)a b a b λ = − .
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Figure 6: Counterfactual distribution of value-weak preference for the public sector 
and its joint density with moral values 
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Note: Estimated parameter values for the counterfactual bivariate beta distribution is 
1 1 2 2( , , , , ) (5.06,3.53,7.51,8.65, 0.21)a b a b λ = − . 
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Figure 7: PUNEs  
0.8, 0.21γ β= = −  1.0, 0.30γ β= = −  
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Note:  
(1) Rectangles denote the observed policies of the two parties 
(2) Mid size dots represent the ideal policies of the militants in the two parties 
(3) Bigger dots represent the average equilibrium policies of the two parties. 
(4) Smallest dots represent PUNEs. 
(5) We use Blue color for Democrats and Red color for Republicans. 
(6) The horizontal axis is the size of the public sector and the vertical axis is the moral 
value issue
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Figure 8: Equilibrium voter separation—full and counterfactuals 
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Note: In each column, the first panel is based on the actual distribution ( , )F θ ρ  whereas 
the second panel is based on the counterfactual distribution '( , )G θ ρ . In both panels, the 
flatter line is the voter separation line when the policy space is two dimensional whereas 
the steeper line is the voter separation line when the policy space is one-dimensional. All 
separation lines are evaluated at the average equilibrium policies. 
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Figure 8 (continued): Equilibrium voter separation—full and counterfactuals  
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Note: The first panel is based on the actual distribution ( , )F θ ρ  whereas the second 
panel is based on the counterfactual distribution '( , )G θ ρ . In both panels, the flatter line is 
the voter separation line when the policy space is two dimensional whereas the steeper 
line is the voter separation line when the policy space is one-dimensional. All separation 
lines are evaluated at the average equilibrium policies.
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Appendix: ANES 2004 Pre-Post Study variables used in the paper 
 
Variables Definitions 
spending Some people think government should provide fewer services even in 
areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Suppose 
these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other people feel it is 
important for the government ro provide many more services even if it 
means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at the other end, 
at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in 
between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale? (Rescaled into 0-1) 
job Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that 
every person has a job and a good standard of living. Suppose these 
people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others think the government 
should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these people 
are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have 
opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would 
you place yourself on this scale?  (Order reverted and then rescaled into 
0-1.) 
health There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. 
Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which 
would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone. Suppose 
these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that all 
medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private 
insurance plans like Blue Cross or other company paid plans. Suppose 
these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other 
people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. 
Where would you place yourself on this scale? (Order reverted and then 
rescaled into 0-1.) 
publicsize average of spending, job, and health 
womenrole Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people 
feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, 
industry, and government. (Suppose these people are at one end of a 
scale, at point 1.) Others feel that a woman's place is in the home. 
(Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, 
some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 
5 or 6.  (Rescaled into 0-1.) 
workingmom A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship 
with her children as a mother who does not work.' Do you AGREE (1), 
NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (3), or DISAGREE (5) with this 
statement? (Order reverted and then rescaled into 0-1.) 
womenhome It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside 
the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.'  Do you 
AGREE (1), NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (3), or DISAGREE 
(5) with this statement? (Order reverted and rescaled into 0-1.) 
abortion There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. 
Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You 
can just tell me the number of the opinion you choose.   
1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.  
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when 
the woman's life is in danger.  
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or 
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danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has 
been clearly established.  
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a 
matter of personal choice. 
(Order reverted and then rescaled into 0-1.) 
homo_nodiscrimination Do you FAVOR (1) or OPPOSE (5) laws to protect homosexuals against 
job discrimination? (Order reverted and then rescaled into 0-1.) 
gaymarriage Should same-sex couples be ALLOWED to marry, or do you think they 
should NOT BE ALLOWED to marry? 
1. Should be allowed  
3. Should not be allowed  
5. Should not be allowed to marry but should be allowed to legally form 
a civil union [VOL] 
(Reclassified as ‘should be allowed’ (1) and ‘should not be allowed (3 & 
5) and then rescaled into 0-1.) 
newlifestyles_problem The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society. Do 
you AGREE STRONGLY (1), AGREE SOMEWHAT (2), NEITHER 
AGREE NOR DISAGREE (3), DISAGREE SOMEWHAT (4), or 
DISAGREE STRONGLY(5) with this statement? (Order reverted and 
then rescaled into 0-1.) 
tradition_important This country would have many fewer problems if there were more 
emphasis on traditional family ties.' Do you AGREE STRONGLY (1), 
AGREE SOMEWHAT (2), NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE (3), 
DISAGREE SOMEWHAT (4), or DISAGREE STRONGLY(5) with this 
statement? (Order reverted and then rescaled into 0-1.) 
moralvalue Average of womenrole, workingmom, womenhome, 
homo_nodiscrimination, gaymarriage, newlifestyles_problem, and 
tradition_important. 
aidtoblacks Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every 
effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose 
these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that the 
government should not make any special effort to help blacks because 
they should help themselves. (Suppose these people are at the other end, 
at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere 
in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale? (Rescaled into 0-1) 
blackfavor Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be 
given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference 
in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks 
advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion -- are you FOR 
(1) or AGAINST (5) preferential hiring and promotion of blacks? 
(Rescaled into 0-1.) 
raceissue Average of aidtoblacks and blackfavor 
therm_whites (blacks, 
poor, feminists, 
homosexuals, 
southerners etc) 
I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other 
people who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person ( a 
group of people) and I'd like you to rate that person (group) using 
something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees 
and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the 
person (group). Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you 
don't feel favorable toward the person (group) and that you don't care too 
much for that person (group). You would rate the person (group) at the 
50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the 
person (group). If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, 
you don't need to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the 
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next one. 
antiblackaffect thermometer feeling towards the respondent’s own race minus 
thermometer feeling towards blacks 
bible Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings 
about the Bible? You can just give me the number of your choice. 
1. The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word 
for word.  
2. The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken 
literally, word for word.  
3. The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God. 
(Order reverted and then rescaled into 0-1.) 
pray_often People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending 
religious services, do you pray SEVERAL TIMES A DAY (1), ONCE A 
DAY (2), A FEW TIMES A WEEK (3), ONCE A WEEK OR LESS (4), 
or NEVER (5)? (Order reverted and then rescaled into 0-1.) 
religiosity Average of pray_often and bible 
biggovt You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which 
one is closer to your own views. ONE, we need a strong government to 
handle today's complex economic problems; OR TWO, the free market 
can handle these problems without government being involved. 
(Rescaled into 0-1.) 
iraqwarissue Do you APPROVE (1) or DISAPPROVE (5) of the way George Bush is 
HANDLING THE WAR IN IRAQ? (Rescaled into 0-1.) 
taxcutissue As you may recall, President Bush signed a big tax cut a few years ago. 
Did you FAVOR (1) or OPPOSE the tax cut (5), or is this something you 
haven't thought about (3). (Rescaled into 0-1.) 
ssreform A proposal has been made that would allow people to put a portion of 
their Social Security payroll taxes into personal retirement accounts that 
would be invested in private stocks and bonds. Do you FAVOR (1) this 
idea, OPPOSE (5) it, or NEITHER FAVOR NOR OPPOSE it (3)? 
(Rescaled into 0-1.) 
schoolvouchers Do you FAVOR (1) or OPPOSE (5) having the government give parents 
in low-income families money to help pay for their children to attend a 
private or religious school instead of their local public school? (Rescaled 
into 0-1.) 
environmentissue Some people think it is important to protect the environment even if it 
costs some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard of living. (Suppose 
these people are at one end of the scale, at point number 1) Other people 
think that protecting the environment is not as important as maintaining 
jobs and our standard of living. (Suppose these people are at the other 
end of the scale, at point number 7. And of course, some other people 
have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6). 
(Rescaled into 0-1.) 
trust Generally speaking, would you say that most people CAN BE 
TRUSTED (1), or that you CAN'T BE TOO CAREFUL (5) in dealing 
with people? (Order reverted and rescaled into 0 & 1.) 
pastfinancial We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. 
Would you say that you (and your family living here) are BETTER off 
(1) or WORSE off (5) than you were a year ago or JUST ABOUT THE 
SAME (3)? (Order reverted and rescaled into -1,0,1.)  
futurefinancial Now looking ahead, do you think that a year from now you (and your 
family living here) will be BETTER OFF (1) financially, WORSE OFF 
(5), or JUST ABOUT THE SAME (3) as now? (Order reverted and 
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rescaled into -1,0,1.) 
pasteconomy Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you 
say that over the past year the nation's economy has gotten BETTER (1), 
stayed ABOUT THE SAME (3), or gotten WORSE (5)? (Order reverted 
and rescaled into -1,0,1.) 
futureeconomy What about the next 12 months? Do you expect the economy, in the 
country as a whole, to get BETTER (1), stay ABOUT THE SAME (3), or 
get WORSE (5)? (Order reverted and rescaled into -1,0,1.) 
age age 
education Education 1. 8 grades or less and no diploma or equivalent; 2. 9-11 
grades, no further schooling; 3. High school diploma or equivalency; 4. 
More than 12 years of schooling; 5. Junior or community college level 
degree; 6. BA level degrees; 7. Advanced degree, including LLB. 
income_hh Income of the household (in $10,000) 
  
